In what sense, if any, are philosophers experts in their domain of research and what could philosophical expertise be? The above questions are particularly pressing given recent methodological disputes in philosophy. The so called expertise defense recently proposed as a reply to experimental philosophers postulates that philosophers are experts qua having improved intuitions. However, this model of philosophical expertise has been challenged by studies suggesting that philosophers’ intuitions are no less prone to biases and distortions than intuitions on non-philosophers. Should we then give up on the idea that philosophers possess some sort of expertise?

In this talk I will argue that instead of focusing on intuitive judgements as the predominant results of philosophical practice, we may understand the relevant characteristic results of philosophical practice more broadly and investigate other kind(s) of expertise they would require. My proposal is inspired by a prominent approach to investigate expert performance from psychology. In developing this alternative model I will discuss the following three candidates for such results: arguments, theories and distinctions. My goal will be to offer a provisional map of where to look for the instances of philosophical expertise beyond intuitions. If time allows, I will discuss the prospects of empirically testing one instance of philosophical expertise by means of the Cognitive Reflection Test.

Bio:

Anna is a postdoctoral researcher in the project ‘Intuitions in Science and Philosophy’ at the Centre for Science Studies and affiliated researcher at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), University of Oslo. She has background in philosophy and psychology. Her research focuses on several topics from philosophical methodology, such as the nature and use of intuitions, expertise, intuitions in philosophy of language. Her other main domain of research concerns the nature and epistemology of linguistic understanding.